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Abstract

Generally, the goal of identiﬁcation schemes is to provide security assurance against impersonation attacks. Identiﬁcation schemes based on zero knowledge protocols have more advantages,
for example, deniability, which enables the prover to deny an identiﬁcation proof so that the veriﬁer couldn’t persuade others that it is indeed the prover who identiﬁed itself to him. This kind
of identiﬁcations is called ‘deniable identiﬁcation’. However, in some applications we require the
existence of a (trusted) party being able to ﬁnd out an evidence that a party did identify itself to
a veriﬁer is required, in order to prevent parties from misbehavior. So in this case ‘undeniability’
is needed. To the best of our knowledge, an identiﬁcation scheme that provides both deniability
and undeniability does not exist in the literature. In this work we propose the notion of escrowed
deniable identiﬁcation schemes, which integrates both ‘escrowed deniability’ (undeniability) and
‘deniability’ properties. Intuitively, in the online communication, a veriﬁer may sometimes need to
provide an evidence of a conversation between himself and the prover, for instance, an evidence
for the case of misuse of the prover’s privilege. We then provide an escrowed deniable identiﬁcation scheme, and prove its security, i.e. impersonation, deniability and escrowed deniability, in the
standard model based on some standard number theoretic assumptions.
Keywords: identiﬁcation, deniability, escrowed deniability, zero knowledge, transferability,
standard model

1

Introduction

Since the seminal introduction of zero-knowledge proof by Goldwasser, Micali and Rackoff many
interactive identiﬁcation schemes based on zero-knowledge proofs have been proposed. An interactive identiﬁcation scheme is a protocol involving two parties, a prover named Peggy, and a veriﬁer
named Victor. An identiﬁcation scheme is to provide an assurance for the veriﬁer that the identity
of the prover is indeed as declared. Imagine that Peggy tries to convince Victor of her identity in
an online communication. In order to convince Victor, Peggy ﬁrst provides a public information,
which is publicly accessible to every one, and it is associated to her corresponding secret information. By using this secret information, Peggy communicates interactively with Victor, and proves
that she is the one who possesses such a secret information corresponding to the public information. Generally, the public information is an instance of a hard problem, which cannot be solved by
efﬁcient algorithms, and the secret information is a solution to this instance.
★
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The security of an identiﬁcation scheme indicates that no efﬁcient adversary can succeed in
impersonating Peggy to Victor (with non-negligible probability), however, in most of the schemes
in the literature an identiﬁcation transcript does reveal the identity of the prover to everyone. That
is, Victor can convince anyone that Peggy did identify herself to him. In the following, we borrow the politician example given in [24] and extend it. Politicians would like to enter a building
equipped with a smart card identiﬁcation system. A politician acts as a prover and the smart card
reader acts as a veriﬁer. In order to prevent the identities of politicians who entered the building
from being revealed to paparazzi by the smart card veriﬁcation system, deniable identiﬁcation is
needed in this case. Now imagine that at sometime, an emergency occurred in the building, and the
administrator of it needs to ﬁnd out who entered this building at certain time interval. If we still
use deniable identiﬁcation, an identiﬁcation transcript does not necessarily mean that a politician
did enter the building at that time interval. Hence, a new variant of identiﬁcation schemes that we
call ‘escrowed deniable identiﬁcation’ is required. In this primitive, there is a (trusted) party who
is able to produce an evidence to prove that a prover has participated in the generation of the identiﬁcation transcript, and furthermore, the veriﬁer cannot do so without the help of the trusted party.

1.1

Related work

From the inspiration of the identiﬁcation scheme given by Fiat and Shamir [11], some other important identiﬁcation schemes such as [22, 17, 18, 12, 10] have been proposed. Feige, Fiat, and Shamir
proposed an identiﬁcation scheme in 1988, which is based on the difﬁculty of inverting RSA, which
is a well known cryptographic primitive. Later, another identiﬁcation scheme based on RSA was
proposed by Guillou and Quisquarter [12]. In 1989, based on discrete logarithm problem, the state
of art of identiﬁcation scheme was introduced by Schnorr [22].
In the early 21th century, Bellare and Palacio [4] analyzed Guillou-Quisquarter scheme and
Schnorr scheme, and showed that the security against passive attacks of the two schemes can be
reduced to standard computational problems such as factoring or discrete logarithms and, their
security against active and concurrent attacks can be proven under one-more RSA assumption and
one-more discrete logarithm assumption.
After the introduction of bilinear pairing to cryptography, many new problems such as Gap
Difﬁe-Hellman problem, Bilinear Difﬁe-Hellman problem and etc. have been studied. Many new
identiﬁcation schemes based on these new problems have been proposed in the literature. For
example, the ﬁrst identiﬁcation based on bilinear Difﬁe-Hellman problem was given by Kim and
Kim [15]. However, their scheme was later broken and improved by Yao, Wang and Wang [25].
For the security deﬁnition, Shoup ﬁrst formalized the deﬁnition of impersonation of identiﬁcation schemes for passive and active attacks [23]. Later, Bellare and Palacio in [4] analyzed
the passive and active attacks and formalized the deﬁnition of concurrent attacks for identiﬁcation
schemes. However, none of these known schemes considers the notion of deniability.
The concept of deniability in authentication was ﬁrst introduced by Dwork, Naor and Sahai
[9]. Later, the deniable zero knowledge was formalized by Pass [19]. Following the above works
on deniability, some works in other areas such as authentication and key exchange ( [21, 20]) were
proposed.
In 2008, Huang et al.[13] proposed a technique that transforms a weakly unforgeability secured
signature scheme into a fully unforgeability secured signature scheme in the standard model. A
strong one-time signature is used to sign on a message concatenated with a regular signature signed
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on a one-time public key. Such a transformation provides a security in the standard model if a
signature scheme is the weakly unforgeability secured in the standard model (in other words, the
signature is fully unforgeability secured in the random oracle model). We incorporate this technique
to construct our EDID scheme in the standard model. In EUROCRYPT 1998, Asokan, Shoup
and Waidner[2] proposed a publicly veriﬁable encryption (fair exchange) protocol. The encrypted
signatures are fairly exchange and veriﬁable that they have been encrypted with the trusted third
party’s public key and the (encrypted) signatures is valid before each party reveals their decrypted
signature in the last round. If one of parties is dishonest, then the other party can request the
trusted third party to reveal the signature. We apply this concept in our EDID scheme to achieve
the deniable and openable proof of the transcript.
1.2

Our Contributions

To the best of our knowledge, there is no identiﬁcation which integrates both the deniability and undeniability. In this work we ﬁrst propose the notion of ‘escrowed deniable identiﬁcation schemes’,
which protects the identity of the prover from being revealed to the public by the veriﬁer, and
in the meanwhile, endows a (trusted) party with the ability to reveal the prover’s identity from
an identiﬁcation transcript non-interactively, thus restricting provers from misbehavior. We then
provide formal security deﬁnitions for escrowed deniable identiﬁcation schemes, which includes
impersonation, deniability, and transferability/escrowed deniability. Finally, we propose a concrete
and efﬁcient construction of escrowed deniable identiﬁcation scheme, and prove its security in the
standard model based on some standard number-theoretic assumptions.
We note that there are several works studying the ‘escrow’ property in other areas, such as
veriﬁable escrowed signatures by Mao [16], ‘escrowed linkability of ring signatures’ by Chow,
Susilo and Yuen [8], and etc. These works are closely related to our work in the deﬁnition of
‘escrow’, however, it is not trivial and easy to transform these works to obtain an escrowed deniable
identiﬁcation scheme. We also note that our new primitive shares some commonalities with the
recent notion of ‘ambiguous fair exchange’ due to Huang et al. [14]. Nonetheless, our primitive
requires the transferability property which allows the veriﬁer can prove to others without revealing
the prover’s signature that the prover ever identiﬁed himself (c.f. [14]). Although the construction
in [14] can be extended to provide this extra property, we take a different approach to achieve a
more efﬁcient scheme in our concrete scheme.
1.3

Paper Organization

In the next section we review some number-theoretic assumptions which will be used in our construction. We provide the deﬁnition of escrowed deniable identiﬁcation scheme in Sec. 3. The
formal models of security properties of an escrowed deniable identiﬁcation scheme are also given
here. In Sec. 4 we propose our efﬁcient construction of escrowed deniable identiﬁcation scheme.
Its security is analyzed in Sec. 5. Section 6 is the conclusion of the paper.

2
2.1

Preliminaries
Notation

For the sake of consistency, the following notations will be used throughout the rest of the paper.
We use the variable 𝑘 as the security parameter. We say that an algorithm 𝐴 is polynomial-time in
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𝑘 if its running time is bounded by some polynomial. For simplicity, we simply call an algorithm
PPT if it is probabilistic polynomial-time in 𝑘. A function 𝑓 : ℕ → [0, 1] is said to be negligible in
𝑛, if for any constant 𝑐 and for all sufﬁciently large 𝑛’s, it holds that 𝑓 (𝑛) < 1/𝑛𝑐 . The operation
$

of picking an element 𝑙 at random from a (ﬁnite) set 𝐿 is denoted by 𝑙 ← 𝐿.
In an identiﬁcation scheme we denote by 𝑃 (𝑉 ) an honest prover (veriﬁer), and by 𝑃 ∗ (𝑉 ∗ )
a malicious prover (veriﬁer) which may deviate from the protocol in an arbitrary way. We also
denote by ⟨𝐴(.), 𝐵(.)⟩(.) an execution of an interactive protocol between two PPT algorithms 𝐴
and 𝐵, i.e., ⟨𝑃 (𝑠𝑘), 𝑉 ⟩(𝑝𝑘) is an execution of the identiﬁcation scheme between the prover 𝑃 with
a secret key 𝑠𝑘 and the veriﬁer 𝑉 on common input 𝑝𝑘. We denote by 𝐴𝑂 (.) an algorithm 𝐴 which
has oracle access to another function 𝑂.
2.2

Basic Concepts on Bilinear Pairings and Complexity Assumptions

Let 𝔾1 and 𝔾2 be cyclic multiplicative groups generated by 𝑔1 and 𝑔2 respectively. The order of
both generators is a prime 𝑝. Let 𝔾𝑇 be a cyclic multiplicative group with the same order 𝑝. We
say that 𝑒ˆ : 𝔾1 × 𝔾2 → 𝔾𝑇 is an admissible bilinear pairing if the followings hold:
1. Bilinearity: 𝑒ˆ(𝑔1𝑎 , 𝑔2𝑏 ) = 𝑒ˆ(𝑔1 , 𝑔2 )𝑎𝑏 for all 𝑔1 ∈ 𝔾1 , 𝑔2 ∈ 𝔾2 , 𝑎, 𝑏 ∈ ℤ𝑝 .
2. Non-degeneracy: There exists 𝑔1 ∈ 𝔾1 and 𝑔2 ∈ 𝔾2 such that 𝑒ˆ(𝑔1 , 𝑔2 ) ∕= 1.
3. Computability: There exists an efﬁcient algorithm to compute 𝑒ˆ(𝑔1 , 𝑔2 ) for all 𝑔1 ∈ 𝔾1 , 𝑔2 ∈
𝔾2 .
Deﬁnition 1 (𝑞-Strong Difﬁe-Hellman (𝑞-SDH) Problem). Given a (𝑞 + 2)-tuple (𝑔1 , 𝑔2 , 𝑔2𝑠 ,
2
𝑞
𝑔2𝑠 , ..., 𝑔2𝑠 ) as input, where 𝑔1 , 𝑔2 are generators of cyclic groups 𝔾1 , 𝔾2 of prime order 𝑝 and
1/(𝑠+𝑐)
𝑠 ∈ ℤ𝑝 , output a pair (𝑐, 𝑔1
) where 𝑐 ∈ ℤ∗𝑝 . An algorithm 𝒜 is said to (𝑡, 𝜖) solves the 𝑞-SDH
problem in (𝔾1 , 𝔾2 ) if 𝒜 runs in time 𝑡, and
[ (
)]
) (
1
𝑠+𝑐
𝑠 𝑠2
𝑠𝑞
Pr 𝒜 𝑔1 , 𝑔2 , 𝑔2 , 𝑔2 , ..., 𝑔2 = 𝑐, 𝑔1
≥ 𝜖,
where the probability is taken over the random choices of 𝑐, 𝑠 ∈ ℤ∗𝑝 and the random bits consumed
by 𝒜.
Assumption 1. (𝑞-Strong Difﬁe-Hellman Assumption [6])
We say that the (𝑞, 𝑡, 𝜖)-SDH (or
𝑞-SDH, for simplicity) assumption in (𝔾1 , 𝔾2 ) holds if there is no PPT algorithm that (𝑡, 𝜖) solves
the 𝑞-SDH problem.
For simplicity, we assume that 𝔾1 = 𝔾2 , and let 𝔾1 , 𝔾𝑇 be two cyclic (multiplicative) groups
of prime order 𝑝 with an admissible bilinear pairing 𝑒ˆ : 𝔾1 × 𝔾1 → 𝔾𝑇 . Let 𝑔 be a generator of
𝔾1 .
Deﬁnition 2 (Decision Linear Difﬁe-Hellman (DLDH) Problem). Given a random 6-tuple (𝑢, 𝑣,
𝑤, 𝑢𝑎 , 𝑣 𝑏 , ℎ) ∈ 𝐺1 as input, decide whether or not ℎ = 𝑤𝑎+𝑏 . An algorithm 𝒜 is said to (𝑡, 𝜖) solves
the DLDH problem in 𝔾1 , if 𝒜 runs in time 𝑡, and
 [ (
)
]
[ (
)
]


Pr 𝒜 𝑢, 𝑣, 𝑤, 𝑢𝑎 , 𝑣 𝑏 , ℎ = 𝑤𝑎+𝑏 = 1 − Pr 𝒜 𝑢, 𝑣, 𝑤, 𝑢𝑎 , 𝑣 𝑏 , ℎ = 𝑤𝑐 = 1  ≥ 𝜖,
where the probability is taken over the random choices of 𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐 ∈ ℤ𝑝 , 𝑢, 𝑣, 𝑤 ∈ 𝔾1 , and the
random bits consumed by 𝒜.
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Assumption 2. (Decision Linear Difﬁe-Hellman Assumption [5]) We say that the (𝑡, 𝜖)-DLDH
assumption in 𝔾1 holds if there is no PPT algorithm that (𝑡, 𝜖) solves the DLDH problem.
2

𝑞

Deﬁnition 3 (𝑞-Discrete Logarithm (𝑞-DL) Problem). Given a (𝑞 + 2)-tuple (𝑔, 𝑔 𝑠 , 𝑔 𝑠 , ..., 𝑔 𝑠 )
as input, where 𝑔 is a generator of group 𝔾1 of prime order 𝑝 and 𝑠 ∈ ℤ𝑝 , output 𝑠. An algorithm
𝒜 is said to (𝑡, 𝜖) solves 𝑞-DL problem in 𝔾1 if 𝒜 runs in time 𝑡, and
[ (
)
]
2
𝑞
Pr 𝒜 𝑔, 𝑔 𝑠 , 𝑔 𝑠 , ..., 𝑔 𝑠 = 𝑠 ≥ 𝜖,
where the probability is taken over the random choice of 𝑠 ∈ ℤ𝑝 and the random bits consumed by
𝒜.
Assumption 3. (𝑞-Discrete Logarithm (𝑞-DL) Assumption)
We say that the (𝑞, 𝑡, 𝜖)-DL (or
𝑞-DL, for simplicity) assumption in 𝔾1 holds if there is no PPT algorithm that (𝑡, 𝜖) solves the
𝑞-DL problem.
2.3

Boneh-Boyen Short Signature Without Random Oracles

In this section, we brieﬂy describe the Boneh-Boyen signature scheme (or 𝐵𝐵04 signature, in
short) [6] which we will incorporate to construct our escrowed deniable identiﬁcation in the standard model. The 𝐵𝐵04 signature scheme described as follows:
Key Generation (KeyGen): KeyGen randomly selects 𝑔𝑎 ∈ 𝔾1 ; 𝑔𝑏 ∈ 𝔾2 ; 𝛼, 𝜂 ∈ ℤ𝑝 and computes 𝒰 = 𝑔2𝛼 , 𝒱 = 𝑔2𝜂 , 𝒵 = 𝑒ˆ(𝑔1 , 𝑔2 ). The public key is 𝑝𝑘𝑆 = (𝑔1 , 𝑔2 , 𝒰 , 𝒱, 𝒵) and the
secret key is 𝑠𝑘𝑆 = (𝛼, 𝜂).
Signing (Sign): Given a secret key 𝑠𝑘𝑆 , a public key 𝑝𝑘𝑆 and a message 𝑚 ∈ ℤ𝑝 , Sign randomly
1/(𝛼+𝑟⋅𝜂+𝑚)
selects 𝑟 ∈ 𝑧𝑝 and computes 𝜎 ← 𝑔1
. The signature on message 𝑚 is (𝜎, 𝑟)
Veriﬁcation (Verf): Given a signature, a public key 𝑝𝑘𝑆 and a message 𝑚 ∈ ℤ𝑝 , Verf checks
whether 𝑒ˆ(𝜎, 𝒰 ⋅ 𝒱 𝑟 ⋅ 𝑔2𝑚 ) = 𝒵. If it holds then Accept, otherwise Reject.
Theorem 1. If the (𝑡′ , 𝑞, 𝜖′ )-SDH assumption holds in (𝔾1 , 𝔾2 ), then the 𝐵𝐵04 signature scheme
is (𝑡, 𝑞𝑆 , 𝜖)-secure against strong existential forgery under an adaptive chosen message attack
where T is the maximum time for an exponentiation in 𝔾1 , 𝔾2 , ℤ𝑝 , 𝑞𝑠 ≤ 𝑞, 𝜖 ≈ 2𝜖′ and 𝑡 ≤
𝑡′ − 𝛩(𝑞 2 𝑇 ) [6].
Note that, for simplicity, we deﬁne 𝔾1 = 𝔾2 in our scheme and we denote the 𝐵𝐵04 short
signature as the weakly secure short signature. The 𝐵𝐵04 short signature is different from the
𝐵𝐵04 signature by removing 𝒱, 𝜂 from the public key and secret key, and computing a signature
1/(𝛼+𝑚)
.
as 𝜎 ← 𝑔1

3

Escrowed Deniable Identiﬁcation

In this section, we provide a formal model of an escrowed deniable identiﬁcation scheme and its
security model. Different from previous deﬁnitions of identiﬁcation schemes [4, 18, 22, 23, 1, 3],
we introduce a trusted third party into escrowed deniable identiﬁcation, who has the power of
invoking the deniability of the prover. Therefore, in the security models of escrowed deniable
identiﬁcation schemes, we consider a new property, ‘transferability’. It provides security guarantee
for the trusted third party and the prover, which preserves the privacy for all other cases except the
case in dispute.
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3.1

Escrowed Deniable Identiﬁcation Schemes

We introduce a notion called escrowed deniable identiﬁcation scheme (EDID) that balances both
the need for deniability and the need for undeniability in identiﬁcation schemes. In an escrowed
deniable identiﬁcation scheme, in addition to that the prover can deny an identiﬁcation transcript,
a trusted authority can convert a deniable identiﬁcation transcript into an undeniable one, enabling
anyone to verify ownership of the transcript.
Formally, an EDID scheme involves a prover 𝑃 , a veriﬁer 𝑉 , a trusted authority 𝑇 𝐴, and any
third party 𝑉 ′ . It consists of the following algorithms and protocols:
Setup: On input 1𝑘 , where 𝑘 is the security parameter, the algorithm generates a system parameter, i.e. param ← Setup(1𝑘 ).
KeyGen𝑇 : On input param, it generates a public/secret key pair (𝑝𝑘𝑇 , 𝑠𝑘𝑇 ) for the trusted authority, i.e. (𝑝𝑘𝑇 , 𝑠𝑘𝑇 ) ← KeyGen𝑇 (param).
KeyGen𝑃 : On input param, it generates a public/secret key pair (𝑝𝑘𝑃 , 𝑠𝑘𝑃 ) for the prover, i.e.
(𝑝𝑘𝑃 , 𝑠𝑘𝑃 ) ← KeyGen𝑃 (param).
Identiﬁcation protocol (𝑃, 𝑉 ): This is an interactive protocol between the prover 𝑃 and the veriﬁer 𝑉 . It consists of four rounds of communication and six PPT algorithms, (Cmt𝑉 , Cmt𝑃 , Ch,
Rsp, Check𝑃 , Check𝑉 ), where (Cmt𝑃 , Check𝑃 ) and (Check𝑉 , Cmt𝑉 ) are sets of algorithms
to generate commitments and to verify the commitment run by the prover 𝑃 and the veriﬁer
𝑉 , respectively, Ch is an algorithm to disclose the challenge, and Rsp is an algorithm run by
the prover 𝑃 to generate the response after the process of commitment generation, challenge
disclosure and commitment veriﬁcation.
– Step 1. 𝑉 chooses a challenge 𝑐 at random from a certain domain, and computes 𝑇 ←
Cmt𝑉 (𝑐). 𝑉 then sends 𝑇 to 𝑃 .
– Step 2. 𝑃 chooses 𝑟 at random from a certain domain, and computes 𝑎 ← Cmt𝑃 (𝑟). 𝑃 then
sends 𝑎 to 𝑉 .
– Step 3. 𝑉 runs Ch to reveal a random challenge 𝑐, and sends it to 𝑃 .
– Step 4. After receiving 𝑉 ’s challenge 𝑐, 𝑃 then runs 𝑏 ← 𝑐𝑘𝑃 (𝑐, 𝑇 ). If 𝑏 = 0, 𝑃 aborts;
otherwise, it computes its response by running 𝑧 ← Rsp(𝑠𝑘𝑃 , 𝑟, 𝑐), and sends 𝑧 to 𝑉 .
– Step 5. 𝑉 checks the validity of 𝑃 ’s response by running Check𝑉 (𝑝𝑘𝑇 , 𝑝𝑘𝑃 , 𝑎, 𝑐, 𝑧). If the
output is ‘1’, 𝑉 accepts; otherwise, it rejects.
Open protocol (𝑇 𝐴, 𝑉 ): An open protocol can be formalized by two (probabilistic) polynomialtime algorithms Open, Verf, where Open is invoked by 𝑇 𝐴, and Verf is executed by the veriﬁer 𝑉 . On input a transcript 𝑡𝑟 and the secret key of 𝑇 𝐴, Open outputs an evidence to afﬁrm the
authenticity of 𝑡𝑟. Verf is an algorithm for validating the validity of the evidence with respect
to 𝑡𝑟 and 𝑝𝑘𝑃 . It takes as input 𝑝𝑘𝑇 , 𝑝𝑘𝑃 , 𝑡𝑟 and the evidence, and outputs 1 for accepting or 0
for rejecting the evidence.
Transfer protocol (𝑉, 𝑉 ′ ): A transfer protocol is an interactive protocol between the veriﬁer 𝑉 ,
who possesses a transcript 𝑡𝑟 and its afﬁrmative evidence from the trusted authority (𝑇 𝐴),
and any third party 𝑉 ′ . The aim of the protocol is to convince 𝑉 ′ that 𝑡𝑟 indeed represents an
execution of the identiﬁcation protocol between 𝑃 and 𝑉 .
The completeness can be deﬁned in a natural way. Next we deﬁne other security properties for an
escrowed deniable identiﬁcation scheme.
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3.2

Deniability

Roughly speaking, deniability indicates that given a transcript of an execution of the identiﬁcation
protocol, the prover is able to deny that he is the prover in the execution. To achieve the deniability,
we require that the veriﬁer itself could generate this transcript. Formally, we consider the following
deﬁnition, which share a similarity with that of zero knowledge.
Deﬁnition 4 (Deniability). An escrowed deniable identiﬁcation scheme EDID is deniable if for
any 𝑃 𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑚 ← Setup(1𝑘 ), (𝑝𝑘𝑇 , 𝑠𝑘𝑇 ) ← KeyGen𝑇 (param) and (𝑝𝑘𝑃 , 𝑠𝑘𝑃 ) ← KeyGen𝑃 (param),
for any PPT algorithm 𝒟, for any veriﬁer strategy 𝑉 ∗ , there exists a PPT algorithm 𝑆 which has
oracle access to 𝑉 ∗ , such that
∣Pr[Expt1 (𝑘) = 1] − Pr[Expt2 (𝑘) = 1]∣ = 𝜖(𝑘),
where 𝜖(⋅) is a negligible function in 𝑘, and Expt1 (𝑘) and Expt2 (𝑘) are deﬁned as follows:
Expt1 (𝑘):
Expt2 (𝑘):
∗
∗
𝑡𝑟 ← ⟨𝑃 (𝑠𝑘𝑃 ), 𝑉 ⟩(𝑝𝑘𝑇 , 𝑝𝑘𝑃 ) 𝑡𝑟′ ← 𝑆 𝑉 (𝑝𝑘𝑇 , 𝑝𝑘𝑃 )
𝑏 ← 𝒟(𝑝𝑘𝑇 , 𝑝𝑘𝑃 , 𝑡𝑟)
𝑏′ ← 𝒟(𝑝𝑘𝑇 , 𝑝𝑘𝑃 , 𝑡𝑟)
return 𝑏
return 𝑏
where the probabilities are taken over the random bits used in Setup, KeyGen𝑇 , KeyGen𝑃 , and
random bits consumed by 𝑃 , 𝑉 ∗ , 𝑆 and 𝒟.
3.3

Impersonation

An identiﬁcation scheme is secure against the impersonation meant that no one except the prover 𝑃
with its public key 𝑝𝑘𝑃 can identify itself to others as 𝑃 . In this work we consider the most common
impersonation attacks, i.e. passive attacks and active attacks, which are described as below:
– Passive Attack (imp-pa): This is the weakest form of attacks considered for impersonation.
An adversary can only listen to the interaction between a prover and a veriﬁer, and then begin
to impersonate the prover after the interaction.
– Active Attack (imp-aa): This attack is stronger than the one above. In an active attack, the
adversary, acting as a (cheating) veriﬁer, actively interacts with prover clones in sequence.
After the last execution of the identiﬁcation protocol is over, it starts to impersonate the prover
to others.
(Impersonation under Active Attack): An imp-aa adversary 𝒜 is a pair of PPT algorithms
(𝒜1 , 𝒜2 ), where 𝒜1 acts as 𝑉 ∗ and 𝒜2 acts as 𝑃 ∗ . Let 𝑠𝑡 denote the state of information. The
active attack is initialized by ﬁrst calling Setup, KeyGen𝑇 and KeyGen𝑃 to generate public/secret
key pairs (𝑝𝑘𝑇 , 𝑠𝑘𝑇 ) and (𝑝𝑘𝑃 , 𝑠𝑘𝑃 ) for the trusted authority and the prover respectively. Taking
public keys 𝑝𝑘𝑇 and 𝑝𝑘𝑃 as input, the adversary 𝒜 then performs its attack in the following two
phases:
– Phase 1. (Learning Phase) Given input 𝑝𝑘𝑇 , 𝑝𝑘𝑃 , the adversary 𝒜1 is allowed to interact
with 𝑃 ’s clones sequentially. When each of 𝑃 ’s clones interacts with 𝒜1 , it is initialized with
(𝑝𝑘𝑃 , 𝑠𝑘𝑃 ), 𝑝𝑘𝑇 and fresh random coins. Later, 𝒜1 outputs 𝑠𝑡 to be passed onto 𝒜2 . This
completes phase 1.
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– Phase 2. (Impersonation Phase) At the beginning of phase 2, 𝑉 is initialized with the public
keys 𝑝𝑘𝑇 , 𝑝𝑘𝑃 , while the adversary 𝒜2 is given 𝑠𝑡. Then 𝒜2 tries to impersonate 𝑃 to 𝑉 . At
the end of this phase, 𝑉 outputs a decision bit 𝑏, indicating accept or reject.
The adversary 𝒜 is said to be successful in the attack if 𝑉 outputs 1 at the end of Phase 2. Formally,
we consider the following experiment:
imp−aa
Expt𝒜
(𝑘):
param ← Setup(1𝑘 )
(𝑝𝑘𝑇 , 𝑠𝑘𝑇 ) ← KeyGen𝑇 (param)
(𝑝𝑘𝑃 , 𝑠𝑘𝑃 ) ← KeyGen𝑃 (param)
𝑃 (𝑠𝑘 )
(⊥, 𝑠𝑡) ← 𝒜1 𝑃 (𝑝𝑘𝑇 , 𝑠𝑘𝑇 , 𝑝𝑘𝑃 )
(⊥, 𝑏) ← ⟨𝒜2 (𝑠𝑘𝑇 , 𝑠𝑡), 𝑉 ⟩(𝑝𝑘𝑇 , 𝑝𝑘𝑃 )
return 𝑏

where an oracle call to 𝑃 (𝑠𝑘𝑃 ) results in an execution of the identiﬁcation protocol with the prover
𝑃 and a transcript 𝑡𝑟 is returned.
Deﬁnition 5 (Security against Impersonation under Active Attack). We say an escrowed deniable identiﬁcation scheme EDID is secure against impersonation under active attack, if there is no
PPT adversary 𝒜 = (𝒜1 , 𝒜2 ) such that the probability Pr[Exptimp−aa
(𝑘) = 1] is negligible in 𝑘.
𝒜
Note that in the deﬁnition above the adversary can be the trusted authority. That is, even TA cannot
impersonate the prover in an active attack.
3.4

Transferability

Intuitively, the notion of transferability in escrowed deniability identiﬁcation schemes is aimed to
reveal the transcript conﬁrmation or evidence that proves the validity of the prover of the transcript.
The idea is that a veriﬁer is provided with evidence for a case in dispute to prove to another party
who would like to be convinced of the validity of the transcript. To complete this idea, a trusted
authority is involved to process an opening (transferring) algorithm. Unlike the deniability property
in a general identiﬁcation scheme (ie., zero-knowledge protocol based identiﬁcation schemes), the
veriﬁer can now convince another party that the transcript of an identiﬁcation scheme is actually
due to an interaction with the claimed prover with the help of or evidence from a trusted party.
In the experiment below, the adversary is modeled as a malicious veriﬁer who tries to convince
any third party to accept the transcript without the help of the trusted authority. Hence, the trusted
authority is viewed as an opening oracle 𝒪𝐸𝐷𝐼𝐷𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛 who answers queries for opening the chosen
transcript. We provide a formal deﬁnition of transferability as follows:
Let 𝑉 ∗ be any veriﬁer strategy (honest or malicious). Let (𝑝𝑘, 𝑠𝑘) be the prover’s public key
and private key generated by the key generation algorithm of the identiﬁcation scheme, and let
(𝑝𝑘𝑇 , 𝑠𝑘𝑇 ) be the 𝑇 𝐴’s public key and private key, respectively, generated by the key generation
algorithm of the identiﬁcation scheme. Let 𝑡𝑟 ← ⟨𝑃 (𝑠𝑘), 𝑉 ∗ ⟩(𝑝𝑘) be the transcript of an interaction between 𝑃 and 𝑉 ∗ , and let 𝜎 ← ⟨𝑇 𝐴(𝑠𝑘𝑇 𝐴 ), 𝑉 ∗ ⟩(𝑝𝑘) be the conﬁrmation evidence 𝜎 of
an interaction between 𝑇 𝐴 and 𝑉 ∗ . Let Verf be the veriﬁer’s decision algorithm which takes a
transcript 𝑡𝑟 and its conﬁrmation evidence 𝜎 as inputs and outputs 1 or 0, which indicate ‘accept’
or ‘reject’, respectively. Let 𝑆 be a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm. We consider the
following experiment:
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Expttran
𝒜 (𝑘):
(𝑝𝑘, 𝑝𝑘𝑇 , 𝑠𝑘, 𝑠𝑘𝑇 ) ← KeyGen(1𝑘 )
𝒪𝐸𝐷𝐼𝐷

,𝒪𝐸𝐷𝐼𝐷

𝐼𝐷
𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛
(⊥, 𝑠𝑡) ← 𝒜1
(𝑝𝑘, 𝑝𝑘𝑇 )
(𝑡𝑟∗ , 𝜎 ∗ ) ← 𝒜2 (𝑠𝑡)
If (𝑡𝑟∗ , 𝜎 ∗ ) has been queried to 𝒪𝐸𝐷𝐼𝐷𝐼𝐷 , 𝒪𝐸𝐷𝐼𝐷𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛 then ⊥,
otherwise, in the transfer protocol(or any other protocol for
transferring the proof (𝑡𝑟∗ , 𝜎 ∗ )),
(⊥, 𝑏) ← ⟨𝒜2 (𝑡𝑟∗ , 𝜎 ∗ ), 𝐴𝑛𝑦𝑉 ⟩(𝑝𝑘, 𝑝𝑘𝑇 )
Return 𝑏

Adversary 𝒜 is said to be successful in the attack if 𝐴𝑛𝑦𝑉 outputs 𝑏 = accept.
Deﬁnition 6 (Security against Transferability Attack). An identiﬁcation scheme ID = (KeyGen,
𝑃 , 𝑉 ) is said to be secure against transferability attack if there is no probabilistic polynomial-time
tran adversary 𝒜 = (𝒜1 , 𝒜2 ) such that the probability Pr[Expttran
𝒜 (𝑘) = 1] is negligible in 𝑘.

Oracle 𝒪𝐸𝐷𝐼𝐷𝐼𝐷 :
Oracle 𝒪𝐸𝐷𝐼𝐷𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛 (𝑡𝑟):
Oracle 𝒪𝐻 (𝑠𝑡𝑟):
𝑡𝑟 = (𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑧) ← ⟨𝒪𝐸𝐷𝐼𝐷𝐼𝐷 (𝑠𝑘𝑃 ), 𝑉 ⟩(𝑝𝑘𝑇 , 𝑝𝑘𝑃 )
𝜎 ← Open(𝑠𝑘𝑇 , 𝑝𝑘𝑇 , 𝑡𝑟)
𝑚 ← 𝐻(𝑠𝑡𝑟)
𝑏 ← Verf(𝑡𝑟, 𝜎, 𝑝𝑘𝑇 )
Return 𝑚
Return 𝑡𝑟
Return 𝜎 iff 𝑏 = accept
Otherwise, return ⊥

Figure 1: Oracle for adversary attacking transferability of escrowed deniability identiﬁcation scheme

4
4.1

Our Construction
High Level Idea

Before presenting our construction of escrowed deniable identiﬁcation schemes, we will ﬁrst describe our idea and intuition behind our construction. Let TA’s pair of public/secret keys be (𝑝𝑘𝑇 ,
𝑠𝑘𝑇 ). Firstly, 𝑃 generates a commitment Cmt, and 𝑉 replies with a random challenge 𝑐. Then, 𝑃
signs both Cmt and 𝑐 to obtain 𝜎. Next, 𝑃 will veriﬁably encrypt 𝜎 using the TA’s public key 𝑝𝑘𝑇 .
ˆ to 𝑉 . 𝑉 can check the validity of 𝜎
ˆ with respect to
That is, 𝜎
ˆ ← 𝑉 𝐸𝑝𝑘𝑇 (𝜎). Then, 𝑃 sends 𝜎
𝑝𝑘𝑇 and 𝑝𝑘𝑃 , but 𝑉 cannot transfer this conviction to anyone else (due to the indistinguishability
property of the veriﬁable encryption used). When mischievous behavior occurs, TA converts the
transcript and makes it undeniable. TA can decrypt 𝜎
ˆ using 𝑠𝑘𝑇 to obtain 𝜎, and since 𝜎 is a regular
digital signature generated by 𝑃 , it is undeniable.
4.2

The Construction

In this section, we present our scheme based on the idea outlined above. The construction uses a
Boneh-Boyen short signature scheme and veriﬁable encryption scheme due to Boneh et al. [6, 7].
We incorporate the technique in [13] to construct our EDID scheme in the standard model. The
scheme works as follows.
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1. Setup: Let (𝔾1 , 𝔾𝑇 ) be two multiplicative cyclic groups where ∣𝔾1 ∣ = ∣𝔾𝑇 ∣ = 𝑝 for some
large prime 𝑝. 𝑔, 𝑔1 and 𝑔2 are generators of 𝔾1 and 𝑒ˆ : 𝔾1 × 𝔾1 → 𝔾𝑇 is a bilinear pairing.
Let 𝐻 : {0, 1}∗ → ℤ∗𝑝 be a collision-resistant hash function. The system parameter param
then consists of (𝔾1 , 𝔾𝑇 , 𝑒ˆ, 𝑝, 𝑔, 𝑔1 , 𝑔2 , 𝐻).
2. KeyGen𝑇 : Given the public parameter param, KeyGen𝑇 Select random numbers 𝑥, 𝑦 ∈ ℤ𝑝 ; 𝑊 ∈
𝔾1 and compute 𝑉 = 𝑊 𝑦 , 𝑈 = 𝑉 𝑥 . The public key and private key of the trusted authority
are 𝑝𝑘𝑇 = (𝑈, 𝑉, 𝑊 ) and 𝑠𝑘𝑇 = (𝑥, 𝑦) respectively.
3. KeyGen𝑃 : Given the public parameter param, KeyGen𝑃 selects a random number 𝑠 ∈ ℤ𝑝 and
compute 𝑆𝑃 = 𝑔1𝑠 . The public key and private key of the prover are 𝑝𝑘𝑃 = 𝑆𝑃 and 𝑠𝑘𝑃 = 𝑠
respectively.
4. Identiﬁcation protocol: The protocol comprises two parts. The ﬁrst part is a 4-round zeroknowledge proof protocol of the Schnorr Identiﬁcation, in which the prover 𝑃 proves to the
veriﬁer 𝑉 that he knows the secret key 𝑠 which is the discrete logarithm of the public key
𝑆𝑃 to base 𝑔1 . In the second part of the identiﬁcation protocol, prover 𝑃 generates a 𝐵𝐵04
short signature 𝜎 on the 4-round Schnorr Identiﬁcation transcript he just carried out with the
veriﬁer. 𝑃 then computes 𝜎
ˆ , which is the veriﬁable encryption of 𝜎 under the TA’s public key,
and sends it to the veriﬁer. Finally, 𝑃 proves, in an interactive manner, to the veriﬁer that 𝜎
ˆ is
correctly formed. Following the description above, the protocol will be more than four rounds.
Optimization of the round efﬁciency of the protocol can be done by setting 𝜎 to be the signature on the ﬁrst two rounds of the 4-round Schnorr Identiﬁcation protocol and conducting
the proof-of-correctness of 𝜎
ˆ in parallel with the Schnorr Identiﬁcation with the veriﬁer. The
resulting protocol remains four rounds and it is shown as follows.
$
(a) 1𝑠𝑡 Round (𝑉 to 𝑃 ). (Commitment of Challenge.) 𝑉 randomly generates 𝑐, 𝑑 ← ℤ∗𝑝 , computes 𝕋 = 𝑔1𝑐 𝑔2𝑑 and sends 𝕋 to 𝑃 .
(b) 2𝑛𝑑 Round (𝑃 to 𝑉 ).
$
i. 𝑃 randomly generates 𝑟𝑠 ← ℤ∗𝑝 , computes T = 𝑔1𝑟𝑠 . Now, 𝑃 runs the KeyGen of
𝐵𝐵04 signature for the one time public key 𝑝𝑘𝑂𝑇 and the one time secret key 𝑠𝑘𝑂𝑇 .
However, 𝑃 can simply use some common parameter from param such as 𝑝, 𝑒ˆ for
𝐵𝐵04 signature. Hence, on input param, 𝑃 randomly selects 𝑔𝑎 , 𝑔𝑏 ∈ 𝔾1 ; 𝛼, 𝜂 ∈
ℤ𝑝 and computes the one time public key 𝑝𝑘𝑂𝑇 = (𝑔𝑎 , 𝑔𝑏 , 𝒰 = 𝑔𝑏𝛼 , 𝒱 = 𝑔𝑏𝜂 , 𝒵 =
𝑒ˆ(𝑔𝑎 , 𝑔𝑏 )) and the one time secret key 𝑠𝑘𝑂𝑇 = (𝛼, 𝜂).
$

ii. 𝑃 randomly selects 𝑎, 𝑏 ← ℤ∗𝑝 and computes 𝐸1 = 𝑈 𝑎 and 𝐸2 = 𝑉 𝑏 . Then, 𝑃 ran$

domly generates 𝑟𝑎 , 𝑟𝑏 ← ℤ∗𝑝 and computes 𝐴1 = 𝑈 𝑟𝑎 and 𝐴2 = 𝑉 𝑟𝑏 .
1

iii. Let 𝑚 = 𝐻(𝑝𝑘𝑂𝑇 ). Now, 𝑃 computes a signature 𝜎 = 𝑔 𝑠+𝑚 . Then, 𝑃 computes 𝐸3 =
ˆ as (𝐸1 , 𝐸2 , 𝐸3 ).
𝜎𝑊 𝑎+𝑏 and 𝐴3 = 𝑒ˆ(𝑊, 𝑆𝑃 𝑔1𝑚 )𝑟𝑎 +𝑟𝑏 . Parse 𝐴ˆ as (𝐴1 , 𝐴2 , 𝐴3 ) and 𝐸
iv. Let 𝑚
¯ = 𝐻(T, 𝕋, 𝑝𝑘𝑃 , 𝐸1 , 𝐸2 , 𝐸3 , 𝐴1 , 𝐴2 , 𝐴3 ). On input 𝑝𝑘𝑂𝑇 , 𝑠𝑘𝑂𝑇 , 𝑃 randomly
1
$
ˆ 𝐴)
ˆ to
¯ = 𝑔𝑎𝛼+𝜅⋅𝜂+𝑚¯ . Then 𝑃 sends (T, 𝑝𝑘𝑂𝑇 , 𝜎
¯ , 𝜅, 𝐸,
chooses 𝜅 ← ℤ∗𝑝 and computes 𝜎
𝑉.
(c) 3𝑟𝑑 Round (𝑉 to 𝑃 ). (Challenge.) 𝑉 sends 𝑐, 𝑑 to 𝑃 .
?
(d) 4𝑡ℎ Round (𝑃 to 𝑉 ). (Response.) 𝑃 checks if 𝑇 = 𝑔1𝑐 𝑔2𝑑 . Output ⊥ is the check fails.
Otherwise compute 𝑧𝑠 = 𝑟𝑠 − 𝑐𝑠, 𝑧𝑎 = 𝑟𝑎 − 𝑐𝑎 and 𝑧𝑏 = 𝑟𝑏 − 𝑐𝑏. Set 𝑍ˆ as (𝑧𝑠 , 𝑧𝑎 , 𝑧𝑏 ) and
send 𝑍ˆ to 𝑉 .
(e) (Veriﬁcation.) 𝑉 computes 𝑚
¯ = 𝐻(T, 𝕋, 𝑝𝑘𝑃 , 𝐸1 , 𝐸2 , 𝐸3 , 𝐴1 , 𝐴2 , 𝐴3 ) and 𝑚 = 𝐻(𝑝𝑘𝑂𝑇 )
and outputs accept if the following holds:
?

?

?

¯
𝑇1 = 𝑆𝑃𝑐 𝑔1𝑧𝑠 , 𝑒ˆ(𝑔𝑎 , 𝑔𝑏 ) = 𝑒ˆ(𝜎, 𝒰 ⋅ 𝒱 𝜅 ⋅ 𝑔2𝑚
), 𝐴1 = 𝐸1𝑐 𝑈 𝑧𝑎 ,
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?

𝐴2 =

𝐸2𝑐 𝑉 𝑧𝑏 ,

?

(

𝐴3 =

𝑒ˆ(𝐸3 , 𝑆𝑃 𝑔1𝑚 )
𝑒ˆ(𝑔, 𝑔1 )

)𝑐

𝑒ˆ(𝑊, 𝑆𝑃 𝑔1𝑚 )𝑧𝑎 +𝑧𝑏 .

Output reject otherwise.
5. Open protocol: A protocol can be denoted by 𝑂𝑃 = ( Open, Verf), where Open and Verf are
PPT algorithms used in the protocol detailed in Figure 2.
6. Transfer protocol: A protocol can be denoted by 𝑇 𝑃 = ( Cmt, Ch, Rsp, Check ), where Cmt,
Ch, Rsp and Check are PPT algorithms used in the following protocol, where the veriﬁer 𝑉
proves that a transcript denoted as 𝑡𝑟 is indeed generated by 𝑃 to any third party veriﬁer. This
protocol is illustrated in Figure 2.

5

Security Analysis

In this section, we provide security proofs for our proposed EDID schemes, which include deniability, security against impersonation and transferability (escrowed deniability). For a brief representation, we ﬁrst deﬁne the following notations, which we will use throughout the rest of this
section.
5.1

Deniability

We provide the proof that the identiﬁcation protocol and the transfer protocol in our EDID scheme
are zero knowledge protocol. First, the completeness of the identiﬁcation protocol and the transfer
protocol in EDID scheme are straight forward, hence, it will be omitted. Secondly, the zero knowledge proof of the identiﬁcation protocol and the transfer protocol in EDID scheme are stated as the
following theorems.
Theorem 2. The identiﬁcation protocol in our identiﬁcation scheme EDID is deniable.
Proof. Let 𝒮 be a simulator and 𝑉 ∗ be any veriﬁer. Given the public keys 𝑝𝑘𝑇 = (𝑈, 𝑉, 𝑊 ), and
𝑝𝑘𝑃 = 𝑆𝑃 = 𝑔1𝑠 , algorithm 𝒮 simulates transcripts as follows:
1. First, 𝒮 receives 𝑇 from 𝑉 ∗ , and then computes its response as follows:
$
– 𝒮 ﬁrst selects random generators T′ , 𝐴′1 , 𝐴′2 , 𝐴′3 , 𝜎 ′ ← 𝔾1 .
′
′
= (𝑔𝑎′ , 𝑔𝑏′ , 𝒰 = 𝑔𝑏𝛼′ , 𝒱 =
– Then, 𝒮 run KeyGen of 𝐵𝐵04 signature scheme and obtain 𝑝𝑘𝑂𝑇
′
′
𝑔𝑏𝜂′ , 𝒵 ′ = 𝑒ˆ(𝑔𝑎′ , 𝑔𝑏′ )) and 𝑠𝑘𝑂𝑇
= (𝛼′ , 𝜂 ′ ).
$

′

′

– Next, 𝒮 chooses integers 𝑎′ , 𝑏′ , 𝜅′ ← ℤ∗𝑝 and compute 𝐸1′ = 𝑈 𝑎 , 𝐸2′ = 𝑈 𝑏 . 𝒮 computes
′ ).
𝑚′ = 𝐻(𝑝𝑘𝑂𝑇
¯ ′ = 𝐻(T′ , 𝕋, 𝑝𝑘𝑃 , 𝐸1′ , 𝐸2′ , 𝐸3′ , 𝐴′1 , 𝐴′2 , 𝐴′3 ). Then com– 𝒮 computes 𝐸3′ = 𝜎 ′ 𝑊 𝑎+𝑏 and 𝑚
′

′

1

′

′

pute 𝜎
¯ ′ = 𝑔𝑎𝛼′ +𝜅 ⋅𝜂 +𝑚¯ .
′ ,𝜎
¯ ′ , 𝜅′ , 𝐸1′ , 𝐸2′ , 𝐸3′ , 𝐴′1 , 𝐴′2 , 𝐴′3 ).
– 𝒮 responds 𝒜 with (T′ , 𝑝𝑘𝑂𝑇
∗
′
′
2. After 𝑉 replies with 𝑐 and 𝑑 , 𝒮 checks the validity of (𝑐′ , 𝑑′ ) with respect to 𝕋 and then
rewinds 𝑉 ∗ to previous state and computes a new response as follows:
– Run KeyGen of 𝐵𝐵04 signature scheme and obtain 𝑝𝑘𝑂𝑇 = (𝑔𝑎 , 𝑔𝑏 , 𝒰 = 𝑔𝑏𝛼 , 𝒱 = 𝑔𝑏𝜂 , 𝒵 =
𝑒ˆ(𝑔𝑎 , 𝑔𝑏 )) and 𝑠𝑘𝑂𝑇 = (𝛼, 𝜂).
$

$

– Select 𝜅, 𝑧𝑠 , 𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑧𝑎 , 𝑧𝑏 ← ℤ∗𝑝 ; 𝐸3 ← 𝔾1 ; 𝐸1 = 𝑈 𝑎 ; 𝐸2 = 𝑉 𝑏 ; 𝑇1 = 𝑆𝑃𝑐 𝑔1𝑧𝑠 ; 𝐴1 =
′
𝐸1𝑐 𝑈 𝑧𝑎 ; 𝐴2 = 𝐸2𝑐 𝑉 𝑧𝑏 .
( 𝑒ˆ(𝐸3 ,𝑆𝑃 𝑔𝑚 ) )𝑐
1
– Then, compute 𝑚 = 𝐻(𝑝𝑘𝑂𝑇 ), 𝐴3 =
𝑒ˆ(𝑊, 𝑆𝑃 𝑔1𝑚 )𝑧𝑎 +𝑧𝑏 .
𝑒ˆ(𝑔,𝑔1 )
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Open
TA
𝑚
¯ ← 𝐻(𝕋, T, 𝑝𝑘𝑃 , 𝐸1 ,
𝐸2 , 𝐸3 , 𝐴1 , 𝐴2 , 𝐴3 );
𝑚 ← 𝐻(𝑝𝑘𝑂𝑇 );

V
𝑡𝑟
def
ˆ 𝐸,
ˆ 𝑐, 𝑑, 𝑍)
ˆ
←−−−− 𝑡𝑟 = (𝕋, T, 𝑝𝑘𝑂𝑇 , 𝜎
¯ , 𝜅, 𝐴,

?

iff not (𝑇1 = 𝑆𝑃𝑐 𝑔1𝑧𝑠 ∧
?

¯
)∧
𝑒ˆ(𝑔𝑎 , 𝑔𝑏 ) = 𝑒ˆ(𝜎, 𝒰 ⋅ 𝒱 𝜅 ⋅ 𝑔2𝑚
?

?

𝐴1 = 𝐸1𝑐 𝑈 𝑧𝑎 ∧ 𝐴2 = 𝐸2𝑐 𝑉 𝑧𝑏
𝑚 )𝑐
? (𝑒
ˆ(𝐸3 ,𝑆𝑃 𝑔1
)
∧ 𝐴3 =
𝑒
ˆ(𝑔,𝑔1 )
𝑚 𝑧𝑎 +𝑧𝑏
𝑒ˆ(𝑊, 𝑆𝑃 𝑔1 )
)
then ⊥.
Otherwise,
1/𝑥𝑦 1/𝑥
𝜎 ← 𝐸3 /(𝐸1 𝐸2 );
?

iff 𝑒ˆ(𝑔, 𝑔1 ) = 𝑒ˆ(𝜎, 𝑆𝑃 𝑔1𝑚 ) then
def
Open(𝑠𝑘𝑇 𝐴 ) = 𝜎, else ⊥

𝜎

−−−−→

?

Verf: iff 𝑒ˆ(𝑔, 𝑔1 ) = 𝑒ˆ(𝜎, 𝑆𝑃 𝑔1𝑚 )
then Verf = accept
,else Verf = reject
Transfer
V

Any third party
𝔗

′

$

←−−−− 𝑐′ , 𝑑′ ← ℤ∗𝑝 ; 𝔗 = 𝑔1𝑐 𝑔2𝑑

$

𝑎′ , 𝑟𝑎′ ← ℤ∗𝑝 ;
′
𝐷1 ← 𝜎𝑔2𝑎 ;
𝐷2 ← 𝑒ˆ(𝑔2 , 𝑆𝑃 𝑔1𝑚 )𝑟𝑎′ ;

def

′

𝑡𝑟,𝐷 ,𝐷

Cmt(𝑝𝑘𝑃 , 𝑡𝑟, 𝑟𝑎′ , 𝑎′ ) = (𝐷1 , 𝐷2 ) −−−1−→2
𝑐′ ,𝑑′

?

′

′

def

←−−−− Ch = (𝑐′ , 𝑑′ )

iff (𝔗 = 𝑔1𝑐 𝑔2𝑑 ) then
𝑧 ← 𝑟 𝑎′ + 𝑐 ′ 𝑎′ ;
def
Rsp(𝑝𝑘𝑃 , 𝑠𝑘𝑃 , Cmt, Ch) = 𝑧,
else ⊥

𝑧

−−−−→

Check: 𝑚
¯ ← 𝐻(𝕋, T, 𝑝𝑘𝑃 , 𝐸1 , 𝐸2 ,
𝐸3 , 𝐴1 , 𝐴2 , 𝐴3 ) and 𝑚 ← 𝐻(𝑝𝑘𝑂𝑇 ).
′

?

iff (ˆ
𝑒(𝐷1 , 𝑆𝑃 𝑔1𝑚 )/ˆ
𝑒(𝑔, 𝑔1 ))𝑐 =
𝐷2−1 𝑒ˆ(𝑔2 , 𝑆𝑃 𝑔1𝑚 )𝑧
?

¯
∧ 𝑒ˆ(𝑔𝑎 , 𝑔𝑏 ) = 𝑒ˆ(𝜎, 𝒰 ⋅ 𝒱 𝜅 ⋅ 𝑔2𝑚
),
then the transcript 𝑡𝑟 was generated
by 𝑃

Figure 2: Open & Transfer Protocols
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– Compute 𝑚
¯ = 𝐻(T, 𝕋, 𝑝𝑘𝑃 , 𝐸1 , 𝐸2 , 𝐸3 , 𝐴1 , 𝐴2 , 𝐴3 ), 𝜎
¯ = 𝑔𝑎𝛼+𝜅⋅𝜂+𝑚¯ .
∗
ˆ 𝐴)
ˆ to 𝑉 .
¯ , 𝜅, 𝐸,
– Return (T, 𝑝𝑘𝑂𝑇 , 𝜎
3. Finally, upon the receiving of 𝑐 and 𝑑 from 𝑉 ∗ , 𝒮 aborts if 𝑐 ∕= 𝑐′ or 𝑑 ∕= 𝑑′ . Otherwise, 𝒮
replies with (𝑧𝑠 , 𝑧𝑎 , 𝑧𝑏 ).
From the structure of protocol and the simulation process, the difference between the distriˆ only lies in the
butions of the real transcripts 𝒯 = {𝑡𝑟} and the simulated transcripts 𝒯ˆ = {𝑡𝑟}
′
′
event that the 𝑐 ∕= 𝑐 or 𝑑 ∕= 𝑑 . We denote by INEQ this event. We can see that the probability that
event INEQ happens only with negligible probability. If this is not the case, we can compute the
discrete logarithm of 𝑔2 with respect to the base 𝑔1 . If 𝑐 ∕= 𝑐′ , it turns out that 𝑑 ∕= 𝑑′ as well. Since
′
′
(𝑐−𝑐′ )/(𝑑′ −𝑑)
. As the group order 𝑝 is known, we can get that
𝑔1𝑐 𝑔2𝑑 = 𝑇 = 𝑔1𝑐 𝑔2𝑑 , we get that 𝑔2 = 𝑔1
log𝑔1 𝑔2 = (𝑐 − 𝑐′ )/(𝑑′ − 𝑑) mod 𝑝. This contradicts the discrete logarithm assumption and hence,
we can run this experiment to solve the discrete logarithm problem by setting 𝑔1 = ℎ and 𝑔2 = ℎ𝑎 ,
where ℎ, ℎ𝑎 are instances of the discrete logarithm problem. Therefore, we conclude that for any
PPT algorithm 𝒟,


Pr[𝒟(𝑝𝑘𝑇 , 𝑝𝑘𝑃 , 𝑡𝑟) = 1] − Pr[𝒟(𝑝𝑘𝑇 , 𝑝𝑘𝑃 , 𝑡𝑟)
ˆ = 1] ≤ Pr[INEQ],
which is also negligible in 𝑘.

⊔
⊓

Theorem 3. The transfer protocol in our identiﬁcation scheme EDID = (Setup, KeyGen, 𝑃, 𝑉,
𝑇 𝐴, 𝐴𝑛𝑦𝑉 ) is zero knowledge protocol.
Proof. Let 𝒮 be a simulator and 𝒜 plays a role of any arbitrary veriﬁer 𝑉 ∗ . Let 𝑡𝑟 be a transcript
that 𝒮 want to prove a procession of a proof of transcript 𝑡𝑟, which is a signature 𝜎. 𝒮 simulates
transcripts as follows:
1. First, 𝒮 receives 𝕋 from 𝒜. Upon the access to the random tape used by 𝑉 ∗ , 𝒮 obtain 𝑐′ and
′
′
𝑑′ , where 𝑇 = 𝑔1𝑐 𝑔2𝑑 .
2. Then, 𝒮 computes a response as follows:
$

$

– Select 𝑧 ← ℤ∗𝑝 and 𝐷1 ← 𝔾1 .
¯ ). Then compute
– Compute 𝑚 = 𝐻(𝑝𝑘𝑂𝑇 , 𝜎
( 𝑒ˆ(𝑔,𝑔1 ) )𝑐′
𝐷2 = 𝑒ˆ(𝐷1 ,𝑆𝑃 𝑔𝑚 ) 𝑒ˆ(𝑔2 , 𝑆𝑃 𝑔1𝑚 )𝑧 .
1
– Then 𝒮 returns (𝐷1 ,𝐷2 ) to 𝒜.
3. Upon the receiving of 𝑐 and 𝑑, 𝒮 aborts if 𝑐 ∕= 𝑐′ or 𝑑 ∕= 𝑑′ . Otherwise, 𝒮 replies with 𝑧.
Let 𝑡𝑟𝑡 be a transcript of the real transfer transcripts and 𝑡ˆ
𝑟𝑡 be a transcript of the simulated transfer
transcripts. From the structure of protocol and the simulation process, the difference between the
𝑟𝑡 } only happen
distributions of the real transcripts 𝒯 = {𝑡𝑟𝑡 } and the simulated transcripts 𝒯ˆ = {𝑡ˆ
$

when the 𝑐 ∕= 𝑐′ or 𝑑 ∕= 𝑑′ in the reveal of challenge step. Since both 𝑐, 𝑑 ← ℤ𝑝 , the probability
′
′
that 𝑐 ∕= 𝑐′ or 𝑑 ∕= 𝑑′ but 𝑇 = 𝑔1𝑐 𝑔2𝑑 = 𝑔1𝑐 𝑔2𝑑 is equal to 1/𝑝. Therefore, the distance between
the probability distribution of 𝒯 and 𝒯ˆ caused by this reason is no more than 1/2𝑘 where 𝑘 is a
security parameter and 𝑘 ≈ ∣𝑝∣.
Therefore, the distance between the probability distribution of 𝒯 and 𝒯ˆ is


∗


Pr[⟨𝑃 (𝑠𝑘), 𝑉 ∗ ⟩(𝑝𝑘) = 1] − Pr[𝑆 𝑉 (𝑝𝑘) = 1] < 1/2𝑘 ,
which is negligible for sufﬁciently large 𝑘.

⊔
⊓
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5.2

Security Analysis for Impersonation

The following is the security analysis of our escrowed deniability identiﬁcation scheme against
impersonation under active attacks. Before this, we recall that a conﬁrmation evidence generated
in the 2𝑛𝑑 round of the protocol is indeed a Boneh-Boyen basic short signature.
Theorem 4. Our identiﬁcation scheme EDID is secure against impersonation under active attacks
in the standard model, if the 𝑞-DL assumption holds.
Proof. Suppose that there exists a PPT imp-aa adversary 𝒜 = (𝒜1 , 𝒜2 ) for EDID scheme such
imp−aa
that the probability Pr[Expt𝒜
(𝑘) = 1] is non-negligible. Then we show that there exists a PPT
2
𝑞
adversary ℱ for solving the 𝑞-DL problem using 𝒜 as a subroutine. ℱ is given 𝑔, 𝑔 𝑠 , 𝑔 𝑠 , ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , 𝑔 𝑠 ∈
𝔾1 as input. ℱ computes 𝑔1 and 𝑆𝑃 in the same way with the proof of Lemma 1 in [6]. ℱ then sets
$

𝑔 = 𝑔1𝛾 and 𝑔2 = 𝑔 𝛽 , where 𝛾, 𝛽 ← ℤ𝑝 . Let 𝑂𝑇 = {𝑝𝑘𝑂𝑇,1 , 𝑠𝑘𝑂𝑇,1 , ..., 𝑝𝐾𝑂𝑇,𝑞𝐻 , 𝑠𝑘𝑂𝑇,𝑞𝐻 } be the
list of pre-computed one-time public keys and secret keys. Let 𝐿𝑀 = {𝑚1 = 𝐻(𝑝𝑘𝑂𝑇,1 ), ..., 𝑚𝑞𝐻
= 𝐻(𝑝𝑘𝑂𝑇,𝑞𝐻 )} be the list of hash value of the one time public keys.

Identiﬁcation queries 𝒪𝑃 : On input a call, ℱ simulates the prover as follows:
1. Obtain 𝕋 from 𝒜1 .
$
$
2. First, select random generators T′ , 𝐴′1 , 𝐴′2 , 𝐴′3 ← 𝔾1 . Second, Choose integers 𝑎′ , 𝑏′ ← ℤ∗𝑝
′

$

′

1/(𝑠+𝑚)

and compute 𝐸1′ = 𝑈 𝑎 ; 𝐸2′ = 𝑈 𝑏 . Let 𝑚 ← 𝐿𝑀 . Next, compute 𝜎 = 𝑔1
with
respect to the proof of Lemma 1 in [6]. Then compute 𝐸3′ = 𝜎𝑊 𝑎+𝑏 . Obtain 𝑝𝑘𝑂𝑇 ∈ 𝐻𝑀 ,
$

where 𝑚 = 𝐻(𝑝𝑘𝑂𝑇 ) and then select 𝜅′ ← ℤ∗𝑝 and compute 𝑚
¯ ′ = 𝐻(T, 𝕋, 𝑝𝑘𝑃 , 𝐸1 , 𝐸2 , 𝐸3 ,
′

1

′

𝐴1 , 𝐴2 , 𝐴3 ); 𝜎
¯ ′ = 𝑔𝑎𝛼+𝜅 ⋅𝜂+𝑚¯ . Finally, 𝒪𝑃 returns (T′ , 𝑝𝑘𝑂𝑇 , 𝜎
¯ ′ , 𝜅′ ,𝐸1′ , 𝐸2′ , 𝐸3′ , 𝐴′1 , 𝐴′2 , 𝐴′3 ).
3. 𝒜1 replies with 𝑐, 𝑑.
4. ℱ checks the validility of 𝑐, 𝑑 with respect to 𝕋. If not valid, ℱ aborts the current execution.
Otherwise, it rewinds 𝒜1 to the second step and then computes as follows:
$
(a) 𝑧𝑠 , 𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑧𝑎 , 𝑧𝑏 ← ℤ∗𝑝 ; 𝐸1 = 𝑈 𝑎 ; 𝐸2 = 𝑉 𝑏 ; T = 𝑆𝑃𝑐 𝑔1𝑧𝑠 ; 𝐴1 = 𝐸1𝑐 𝑈 𝑧𝑎 ; 𝐴2 = 𝐸2𝑐 𝑉 𝑧𝑏 .
( 𝑒ˆ(𝐸3 ,𝑆𝑃 𝑔1𝑚 ) )𝑐
(b) Set 𝐸3 = 𝐸3′ and compute 𝐴3 =
𝑒ˆ(𝑊, 𝑆𝑃 𝑔1𝑚 )𝑧𝑎 +𝑧𝑏 .
𝑒ˆ(𝑔,𝑔1 )
$

(c) Select a random integer 𝜅 ← ℤ∗𝑝 and compute 𝑚
¯ = 𝐻(T,𝕋,𝑝𝑘𝑃 ,𝐸1 ,𝐸2 ,𝐸3 ,𝐴1 , 𝐴2 ,𝐴3 );
1
𝛼+𝜅⋅𝜂+𝑚
¯

𝜎
¯ = 𝑔𝑎
.
(d) Finally, 𝒪𝑃 returns (T, 𝑝𝑘𝑂𝑇 , 𝜎
¯ , 𝜅, 𝐸1 , 𝐸2 , 𝐸3 , 𝐴1 , 𝐴2 , 𝐴3 ) to 𝒜
5. 𝒜 replies with 𝑐′ , 𝑑′ .
6. Check the validation of 𝑐′ , 𝑑′ with 𝕋 and check whether 𝑐 = 𝑐′ and 𝑑 = 𝑑′ . If the above
does not hold, ℱ aborts the current execution. Otherwise, it returns 𝑍ˆ = (𝑧𝑠 , 𝑧𝑎 , 𝑧𝑏 ) to 𝒜.
7. Finally, ℱ records a transcript 𝑡𝑟 and a signature 𝜎.
Now, ℱ runs the eimp-aa experiment with 𝒜. First, in the Learning Phase, the entire parameter
is ﬁrst initialized. The public/secret key pair of provers is initially set to 𝑝𝑘𝑃 = 𝑆𝑃 and 𝑠𝑘𝑃 = 𝑠,
Then the 𝑇 𝐴 public/secret key pair is generated by running (𝑝𝑘𝑇 , 𝑠𝑘𝑇 ) ← KeyGen(1𝑘 ). In this
phase, 𝒜 plays a role of 𝒜1 . 𝒜1 is given with 𝑝𝑘𝑃 , 𝑝𝑘𝑇 , 𝑠𝑘𝑇 and the access to 𝒪𝑃 . At the end of
this phase, 𝒜1 outputs a state of information 𝑠𝑡 and passes it to 𝒜2 .
Now we move to the Impersonation Phase. On input 𝑠𝑡 from the Learning Phase, 𝒜2 runs
the identiﬁcation protocol to convince 𝑉 (played by ℱ) to accept 𝒜2 as 𝑃 . Note that the public
parameter for 𝒜2 can be obtained from 𝒜1 in the previous phase. 𝒜2 then interacts with ℱ as the
following protocol:
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–
–
–
–

(ℱ → 𝒜2 )
(𝒜2 → ℱ)
(ℱ → 𝒜2 )
(𝒜2 → ℱ)

Select random integers 𝑐, 𝑑 ∈ ℤ∗𝑝 and compute 𝕋 = 𝑔1𝑐 𝑔2𝑑 . ℱ sends 𝕋 to 𝒜2 .
Reply with (T, 𝑝𝑘𝑂𝑇 , 𝜎
¯ , 𝜅, 𝐸1 , 𝐸2 , 𝐸3 , 𝐴1 , 𝐴2 , 𝐴3 ).
Respond with 𝑐, 𝑑
Return 𝑍ˆ = (𝑧𝑠 , 𝑧𝑎 , 𝑧𝑏 )

ˆ from above
𝒜 wins the game if a transcript 𝑡𝑟 = (𝕋, T, 𝑝𝑘𝑂𝑇 , 𝜎
¯ , 𝜅, 𝐸1 , 𝐸2 , 𝐸3 , 𝐴1 , 𝐴2 , 𝐴3 , 𝑐, 𝑑, 𝑍)
protocol passes the validation. Due to the fact that ℱ possessed 𝛾, 𝛽, which are secret keys to
solve the relationship among 𝑔, 𝑔1 and 𝑔2 , with a overwhelming probability, ℱ then rewinds 𝒜2
to the third step and replies 𝒜2 with 𝑐′ , 𝑑′ ∈ ℤ∗𝑝 such that 𝑐′ ∕= 𝑐 and 𝑑′ ∕= 𝑑. 𝒜2 responds with
𝑍ˆ ′ = (𝑧𝑠′ , 𝑧𝑎′ , 𝑧𝑏′ ) and let 𝑡𝑟2 = (𝕋, T, 𝑝𝑘𝑂𝑇 , 𝜎
¯ , 𝜅, 𝐸1 , 𝐸2 , 𝐸3 , 𝐴1 , 𝐴2 , 𝐴3 , 𝑐′ , 𝑑′ , 𝑍ˆ ′ ) denote the
second transcript. From these two transcripts, ℱ compute 𝑠 as the answer to 𝑞-DL problem.
Next, we conclude the success probability that 𝒜 successes the impersonation. There are two
events that trigger ℱ to abort. We will show that ℱ will abort the simulation with negligible probability. These two events are in the steps 4 and 6 of the identiﬁcation queries. The ﬁrst event is
′
′
that 𝑐 ∕= 𝑐′ ; 𝑑 ∕= 𝑑′ but 𝕋 = 𝑔1𝑐 𝑔2𝑑 = 𝑔1𝑐 𝑔2𝑑 . If this event occurs, then 𝒜1 can be used to solve the
discrete logarithm problem where, on input 𝑔, 𝑔 𝑥 , ﬁnd 𝑥. We simply set 𝑔1 = 𝑔; 𝑔2 = 𝑔 𝑥 then, upon
receiving 𝑐, 𝑑, 𝑐′ and 𝑑′ , we compute 𝑥 = (𝑐−𝑐′ )/(𝑑′ −𝑑). Hence, this event occurs with negligible
probability underlying that the discrete logarithm problem is hard. The last event is when 𝑐, 𝑑 is
dishonestly generated and is consequently not valid. Since the correctness of 𝕋 = 𝑔1𝑐 𝑔2𝑑 holds with
negligible probability of error with regard to the ﬁrst event, we can conclude that if 𝒜1 is correctly
interacting with the identiﬁcation queries, then the second event will not occur. Therefore, we claim
that ℱ solves the 𝑞-DL problem with non-negligible probability by using 𝒜.
To conclude, the above shows that if there exists an adversary that breaks the impersonation of
an EDID scheme under active attack, then we can use this adversary to solve the 𝑞-DL problem
with non-negligible probability. Conversely, if the 𝑞-DL problem holds, then the EDID scheme is
secure against impersonation under active attack.
⊔
⊓
5.3

Security Analysis for Transferability

Theorem 5. Our identiﬁcation scheme EDID = (Setup, KeyGen, 𝑃, 𝑉, 𝑇 𝐴, 𝐴𝑛𝑦𝑉 ) is secure
against transferability attack if only the 𝑞-SDH problem hold under in the standard model.
Proof. From the proof in Theorem 2 and Theorem 3, the identiﬁcation protocol and the transfer
protocol in our EDID scheme (computational) are zero knowledge protocol. Based on the above
statement, we can exclude a PPT tran adversary that can distinguish the simulated transcripts out
of the actual transcripts. We also exclude an adversary that, without help from the trusted third
party, uses any mean (or any protocol) to convince another party that the adversary has actually
interacted with the prover to generate a transcript. If there exists an adversary as described above
then that adversary in fact seems to be an adversary against deniability where the proof has been
provided in a proof of Theorem 2. Hence, the rest of the proof will show that, assumed that there
exists a PPT tran adversary 𝒜 = (𝒜1 , 𝒜2 ), there exists a PPT algorithm ℱ using 𝒜 to solve the
𝑞-SDH problem. Start with ℱ constructing queries and setting up public parameters as follow:
2

𝑞

Parameter setup: First, ℱ is given 𝑔, 𝑔 𝑠 , 𝑔 𝑠 , ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , 𝑔 𝑠 ∈ 𝔾1 as input. Then, ℱ computes 𝑔1 and
𝑆𝑃 in the same way with the proof of Lemma 1 in [6]. ℱ then sets 𝑔 = 𝑔1𝛾 and 𝑔2 = 𝑔 𝛽 , where
$

𝛾, 𝛽 ← ℤ𝑝 . Next, ℱ runs KeyGen𝑇 to get the public key and private key of the trusted authority,
which are 𝑝𝑘𝑇 = (𝑈, 𝑉, 𝑊 ) and 𝑠𝑘𝑇 = (𝑥, 𝑦) respectively. Let 𝑂𝑇 = {𝑝𝑘𝑂𝑇,1 , 𝑠𝑘𝑂𝑇,1 , ...,
∗ , 𝑠𝑘 ∗ } be the list of pre-compute one-time public keys and
𝑝𝐾𝑂𝑇,𝑞𝐻 −1 , 𝑠𝑘𝑂𝑇,𝑞𝐻 −1 , 𝑝𝑘𝑂𝑇
𝑂𝑇
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∗ )}
secret keys. Let 𝐿𝑀 = {𝑚1 = 𝐻(𝑝𝑘𝑂𝑇,1 ), ..., 𝑚𝑞𝐻 −1 = 𝐻(𝑝𝑘𝑂𝑇,𝑞𝐻 −1 ), 𝑚∗ = 𝐻(𝑝𝑘𝑂𝑇
be the list of hash value of the one time public keys.
Identiﬁcation queries 𝒪𝑃 : For every request of transcript to 𝒪𝑃 excepted when 𝑚 = 𝑚∗ , ℱ
constructs identiﬁcation queries in the same way as the proof in Theorem 4. For a case of 𝑚∗ ,
ℱ changes the procedure of the identiﬁcation queries and processes as follows:
1. Obtain 𝕋 from 𝒜1 .
$
$
2. First, select random generators T′ , 𝐴′1 , 𝐴′2 , 𝐴′3 , 𝐸3′ ← 𝔾1 . Second, choose integers 𝑎′ , 𝑏′ ←
′

$

′

∗
ℤ∗𝑝 and compute 𝐸1′ = 𝑈 𝑎 ; 𝐸2′ = 𝑈 𝑏 . Obtain 𝑝𝑘𝑂𝑇
∈ 𝐻𝑀 and then select 𝜅′ ← ℤ∗𝑝 and
1
𝛼+𝜅′ ⋅𝜂+𝑚
¯′

compute 𝑚
¯ ′ = 𝐻(T,𝕋,𝑝𝑘𝑃 ,𝐸1 ,𝐸2 ,𝐸3 , 𝐴1 ,𝐴2 ,𝐴3 ); 𝜎
¯ ′ = 𝑔𝑎
. Finally, 𝒪𝑃 returns
′
′
′
′
′
′
′
′
′
(T , 𝑝𝑘𝑂𝑇 , 𝜎
¯ , 𝜅 ,𝐸1 , 𝐸2 , 𝐸3 , 𝐴1 , 𝐴2 , 𝐴3 ).
3. 𝒜1 replies with 𝑐, 𝑑.
4. ℱ checks the validility of 𝑐, 𝑑 with respect to 𝕋. If not valid, ℱ aborts the current execution.
Otherwise, it rewinds 𝒜1 to the second step and then computes as follows:
$

$

(a) 𝑧𝑠 , 𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑧𝑎 , 𝑧𝑏 ← ℤ∗𝑝 ; 𝐸3 ← 𝔾1
𝐸1 = 𝑈 𝑎 ; 𝐸2 = 𝑉 𝑏 ; T = 𝑆𝑃𝑐 𝑔1𝑧𝑠 ; 𝐴1 = 𝐸1𝑐 𝑈 𝑧𝑎 ; 𝐴2 = 𝐸2𝑐 𝑉 𝑧𝑏 .
( 𝑒ˆ(𝐸3 ,𝑆𝑃 𝑔1𝑚 ) )𝑐
𝑒ˆ(𝑊, 𝑆𝑃 𝑔1𝑚 )𝑧𝑎 +𝑧𝑏 .
(b) Compute 𝐴3 =
𝑒ˆ(𝑔,𝑔1 )
$

(c) Select a random integer 𝜅 ← ℤ∗𝑝 and compute 𝑚
¯ = 𝐻(T,𝕋,𝑝𝑘𝑃 ,𝐸1 ,𝐸2 ,𝐸3 ,𝐴1 , 𝐴2 ,𝐴3 );
1

𝜎
¯ = 𝑔𝑎𝛼+𝜅⋅𝜂+𝑚¯ .
(d) Finally, 𝒪𝑃 returns (T, 𝑝𝑘𝑂𝑇 , 𝜎
¯ , 𝜅, 𝐸1 , 𝐸2 , 𝐸3 , 𝐴1 , 𝐴2 , 𝐴3 ) to 𝒜
′
′
5. 𝒜 replies with 𝑐 , 𝑑 .
6. Check the validation of 𝑐′ , 𝑑′ with 𝕋 and check whether 𝑐 = 𝑐′ and 𝑑 = 𝑑′ . If the above
does not hold, ℱ aborts the current execution. Otherwise, it returns 𝑍ˆ = (𝑧𝑠 , 𝑧𝑎 , 𝑧𝑏 ) to 𝒜.
7. Finally, ℱ records a transcript 𝑡𝑟∗ and a signature 𝜎 ∗ .
Open queries 𝒪𝑂 : ℱ constructs the open queries as follows:
– If 𝑡𝑟 is in the list of queried transcript then return an associated signature 𝜎 excepted 𝑚 =
𝑚∗ return ⊥.
– Otherwise, decrypt 𝑡𝑟 with 𝑠𝑘𝑇 and obtain 𝜎 and then check whether 𝑒ˆ(𝑔, 𝑔1 ) = 𝑒ˆ(𝜎, 𝑆𝑃 𝑔1𝑚 ).
If yes then return 𝜎. If not return ⊥.
Let param = (ˆ
𝑒, 𝑝, 𝑔, 𝑔1 , 𝑔2 ) and 𝑝𝑘𝑆 = 𝑆𝑃 = 𝑔1𝑠 . The private parameters for ℱ are 𝑠𝑘𝑇 𝐴 , 𝛾 and
𝛽. Now, ℱ simulates the Learning Phase by running 𝒜 on input (param,𝑝𝑘𝑃 , 𝑝𝑘𝑇 ,𝒪𝑃 , 𝒪𝑂 ), and
then operates as follows:
– On the request of 𝑡𝑟, 𝒜1 runs the identiﬁcation protocol with 𝒪𝑃 to obtain 𝑡𝑟.
– On the request to open 𝑡𝑟, 𝒜1 arbitrarily sends 𝑡𝑟 to 𝒪𝑂 . 𝒪𝑂 returns a signature 𝜎 on message
𝑚 from 𝑡𝑟, if 𝑡𝑟 and 𝜎 are valid and 𝑡𝑟 is generated by 𝒪𝑂 . Otherwise, it returns a failure.
At the end of this phase, 𝒜1 outputs a state of information 𝑠𝑡 and passes it on to 𝒜2 .
Now, move to the the Convincing Phase, where ℱ plays a role as 𝐴𝑛𝑦𝑉 . Note that the public
parameter for 𝒜2 can be obtained from 𝒜1 in the previous phase. 𝒜2 then interacts with 𝐴𝑛𝑦𝑉 as
the following protocol:
–
–
–
–
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(𝐴𝑛𝑦𝑉 → 𝒜2 )
(𝒜2 → 𝐴𝑛𝑦𝑉 )
(𝐴𝑛𝑦𝑉 → 𝒜2 )
(𝒜2 → 𝐴𝑛𝑦𝑉 )

Select random integers 𝑐, 𝑑 ∈ ℤ∗𝑝 and compute 𝔗 = 𝑔1𝑐 𝑔2𝑑 . ℱ sends 𝔗 to 𝒜2 .
Run {𝑡𝑟, 𝐷1 , 𝐷2 } ← 𝒜2 (𝑠𝑡, 𝑝𝑘𝑃 , 𝑝𝑘𝑇 , param) and reply with (𝑡𝑟, 𝐷1 , 𝐷2 ).
Respond with 𝑐, 𝑑
Return 𝑧 ← 𝒜2 (𝑠𝑡, 𝑝𝑘𝑃 , 𝑝𝑘𝑇 , param, 𝑡𝑟, 𝐷1 , 𝐷2 , 𝑐, 𝑑);
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𝒜 wins the game if a transfer transcript 𝑡𝑟𝑡 = (𝔗, 𝑡𝑟, 𝐷1 , 𝐷2 , 𝑐, 𝑑, 𝑧) from above protocol passes
the validation. Due to the fact that ℱ possessed 𝛾, 𝛽, which are secret keys to solve the relationship
among 𝑔, 𝑔1 and 𝑔2 , with a overwhelming probability, ℱ then rewinds 𝒜2 to the third step and
replies 𝒜2 with 𝑐′ , 𝑑′ ∈ ℤ∗𝑝 such that 𝑐′ ∕= 𝑐 and 𝑑′ ∕= 𝑑. Then 𝒜2 responds with 𝑧 ′ and let
𝑡𝑟𝑡′ = (𝔗, 𝑡𝑟, 𝐷1 , 𝐷2 , 𝑐′ , 𝑑′ , 𝑧 ′ ) denote the second transfer transcript.
Let 𝑞𝐻 , 𝑞𝑂 be a number of queries that 𝒜 makes to identiﬁcation queries and open queries,
respectively. Within the probability 𝑞1𝐻 , 𝒜 processes the second phase with 𝑚∗ . If 𝒜 wins the
game with 𝑚∗ , then, from the above two transcripts, ℱ computes a signature 𝜎 ∗ on message 𝑚∗ as
the answer to 𝑞-SDH problem.
There are certain events that cause ℱ to abort the simulation. We will show that such events
happen with negligible probability or that some are expected to occur with non-negligible probability. First, in the open queries, the ﬁrst event(𝐸1 ) is that ℱ aborts the simulation when 𝑚 = 𝑚∗ . This
event is already expected to happen within the probability (1−1/(𝑞𝐻 ))𝑞𝑂 ≥ 1/𝑒 where 𝑒 is the natural logarithm. The other event(𝐸2 ) is also in the open queries when 𝑡𝑟 is not in the list of transcript
produced by 𝒪𝑃 but it passes the veriﬁcation. This means that 𝒜 can produce a valid transcript.
Then 𝒜 can indeed be used to break the impersonation of our EDID scheme. Hence, from the proof
in Theorem 4, the probability that ℱ aborts in this event is negligible. For the events above, the
probability that ℱ does not abort the simulation is non-negligible, where Pr[𝐸1 ] + Pr[𝐸2 ] ≈ 1/𝑒.
Hence, we claim that the probability that 𝒜 wins the game is non-negligible if the probability of
solving the 𝑞-SDH problem is non-negligible.

6

Conclusion

We introduced a new notion called escrowed deniability in an identiﬁcation scheme. This notion
bridges the gap between deniability and non-deniability in the identiﬁcation scheme. We have
also provided a concrete scheme that satisﬁes this new notion. The security of our identiﬁcation
scheme provides for both impersonation and transferability (escrowed deniability). Proof of these
was also presented. In short, we believe the escrowed deniability property is an essential feature
for identiﬁcation schemes where the need for incorporation and disafﬁrmation is crucial.
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